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GADAMER, DEWEY AND MARX: WORK AND INTERPRETATION
In previous articles, I have attempted to work out the elective affinities between Gadamer and Dewey and also between
Dewey and Marx.   It remains to construct the base of this triangle by drawing a line from Marx to Gadamer.  In
particular, for philosophical hermeneutics, pragmatism, and historical materialism alike, the notion of praxis is
fundamental.  In this paper, then, I aim to clarify the meaning of praxis in the light of Gadamer’s phenomenological
investigation in Truth and Method into the event of understanding. Gadamer’s position is that inasmuch as
understanding “happens” (geschehen) in its eventful character, it happens ontologically, in a lifeworld saturated in
historicity, and it happens practically, in and through its application; or even more fundamentally, as I will argue here, it
happens performatively, in the being-performed of a work (whether it is a work of art or any other kind of “work”). 
Hence, Gadamer’s is a “practical philosophy,” so that far from being a product of the epistemology industry, it heads
towards “overcoming the epistemological problem through phenomenological research” (see TM, 242-64).   The terms
“practical” and praxis are not synonyms, since praxis is the dialectical integration of theory with practice.  But it remains
fundamental to Gadamer’s purpose, as well as to Marx’s and Dewey’s, to criticize a one-sided, abstract, alienated
theoreticism that neither arises from nor returns to its soils in practice; a theory for theory’s sake that forgets its own
rootedness, analogous to the nineteenth-century ideal of art for art’s sake belonging to the “aesthetic consciousness”
that Gadamer masterfully deconstructs in Part I of Truth and Method.
Recently, in “Marxist Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics,” Peter Amato has come out ahead of me by directly
relating Gadamer to Marx without the intermediaries of Paul Ricoeur and Frederic Jameson, “[major] contributors to
Marxist hermeneutics” who have nevertheless “engaged Marx at arm’s length,” so that “the voice of Marx’s revolutionary
politics isn’t really heard” in their work (237).   “Both Jameson and Ricoeur tend to operate from the side of language,
literary and cultural criticism,” whereas Amato aims to develop “a Marxism that would be more adequate to history and
social action because it could conceptualize them as social experience mediated by language.  This would properly be
considered a kind of hermeneutical Marxism rather than a ‘Marxist hermeneutics’” (237).
It will be to the point to observe that Amato is writing forty years after the famous debate between Gadamer and Jürgen
Habermas first got underway.   In the opening round of that debate, Habermas had accused Gadamer of “an idealism
of linguisticality.”   My task here will be to demonstrate that this charge of linguistic idealism is a ship passing in the
night.  A corollary of this demonstration will follow that the nineteenth-century debate between a position typecast as
“idealism” and a position typecast as “materialism” is otiose and obsolete, if not stillborn (featuring figures of the
stature of Feuerbach, Engels, the philosophers of the Second International, Plekhanov, and the Lenin of Materialism
and Empirio-Criticism, poised against such swiftly passing rivals as British Idealists, Neo-Kantians, and logical
positivists).  The idealist-materialist debate thus occupies a twilight zone between two genuine and profound
philosophical moments, the classical German philosophy behind it, Kant through Marx, and the phenomenological
movement ahead of it, the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer. 
Asking how phenomenology comports itself towards the idealist-materialist debate should facilitate what Bernard
Lonergan calls an “inverse insight,” thereby catalyzing a “higher viewpoint.”    Phenomenology does not comport itself
towards the idealist-materialist debate at all.  Rather, it shows that the terms of the debate rest on a philosophical
mistake (the mistake of thinking either that “reality” must be an “idea” or else that an “idea” must be some sort of
property of the physical organization of matter).  The point would hardly be worth mentioning except that Marx’s thought
was somehow assimilated into this materialist idea, Habermas accused Gadamer of linguistic idealism, and the late
Richard Rorty wrote an essay called “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” explaining the
latter as the successor to the former and more or less coming down on its side.  As a corollary of his own position,
Amato argues that despite his attempt to mediate the nineteen-sixties debate between Gadamer and Habermas,
Ricoeur failed to resolve what was at issue (242, n.3).  We might say that by being more or less one-sidedly “textualist”
and “culturalist” in his approach, Ricoeur was insufficiently “historically-materialist.”  Coming at the question anew,
however, with the benefit of historical distance, Amato brings Gadamer together with Marx in an altogether different way.
I will quote him at length:
Gadamer suggests that if any economic or social sub-system is ever to have any effect upon anything, or anyone, it
must be mediated through and interwoven with the culture and history of a group of people and their language.…The
20/12/2013 Current Issue
voyagesjournal.net/Current_Issue.html#west 29/32
back to top
PATRICK WEST
Patrick West, PhD, teaches Professional and Creative Writing in the School of Communication and Creative Arts at
Deakin University. He is author of The World Swimmers (2011), and wrote the script for Sisters of the Sun (2012), a
fictional-documentary film arising from Deakin’s ‘Flows & Catchments’ project. He has published widely, including
‘Zones of Practice: embodiment and creative arts research’ (with Drummond and Keane, in M/C Journal, 2012) and
‘The Bird Watcher’ (in Landscapes, 2010).
LYING IDIOTS: REALITY TELEVISION & LIE TO ME
“the one thing they are not is reality” (1) 
Reg Grundy, September 20, 2010
TV’s appeal was so decimated by the late 1990s, under the blitzkrieg of competition from a host of new media forms,
that the only diversion still available to us, apparently, was our plain old reality.
Henceforth, the audience would tune into itself.…
It almost goes without saying that Reality Television disappointed the expectations generated by its name; no mode of
cultural production can transparently re-produce whatever reality might really be.
Still the rise of this remarkably disingenuous genre—in all its passive-aggressive glory of mock-epic household tiffs
and singers being shuffled straight back to the shower stalls from whence they came—was important in at least one
respect. It gave fresh legs to perhaps the central question for anyone concerned by TV: Who does television think you
are?
“Idiots” springs to mind, as a response derived from “idiot box”—slang term for the TV set. But another meaning of
idiots is more to the point here, one that can be excavated from the classical Greek etymology of idiot, which links the
word, according to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, to “private person […] ignorant person.”
It’s easy to forget that so far as commercial television is concerned the privileged audience sector is not those who
watch TV but those who pay for the advertising that we watch on TV. And what advertisers want for their audience are
precisely “private persons […] ignorant persons:” idiots, that is, in the classical sense.
The idiot meets advertising culture on the latter’s very doorstep. Connected to nothing, idiots must invest in their own
separate reality, through the acquisition of everything, which is advertising’s chimera.
No more radical privatisation of the self can be imagined. The idiot is the ideal target for television advertising, which
gets to pitch to selves of this nature all that a self ignorant and shut off from the world may be lead to believe it requires.
Handily, being ignorant of others, idiots are dupes of the idea that all the resources of the world are available solely for
their benefit—this is, of course, the unspoken premise of all advertising.
Commercial TV must consider its viewers idiots therefore, in order to ensure its own survival, and Reality Television is
idiocy incarnate because it re-produces us—on screen—as persons severed from any relations with the world: either
literally (no news penetrates the walls of the Big Brother house) or figuratively (the Idol experience as reductivist
allegory of the entertainment industry).
Requiring us to identify with cast members who are so decisively cut off from the everyday world, Reality Television
actively invites idiocy through a take-no-prisoners individualisation of those it depicts. Reality Television creates the self
to which it denies all the reality of life. It is the televisual equivalent of solitary confinement, incessantly sampling
Margaret Thatcher’s infamous mythologisation of the individual: “there is no such thing as society.” It makes the self
into all that there is….
This making the self into an idiotic act of the first degree, warrants linking Television Studies to Philosophy as the pre-
eminent study of selfhood. According to John Rajchman, in his introduction to Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life by
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, “Unlike the life of an individual, a life is thus necessarily vague or indefinite, and
this indefiniteness is real” (2). Trapping the self within the confines of the “the”, if there is anything Reality Television is
not it is “vague” and “indefinite”—life upon it has all the clarity and definition of the most crystallized zones of fiction.
To this extent, in addition to being divorced from the world as a determinate domain, those selves catalysed at the
intersection of viewer and viewed upon Big Brother or Idol are even more dramatically severed from life itself. Life here
being the maximisation of reality (as Deleuze would have it), as opposed to the minimised reality of Reality Television.
What we mean here is life in the indefinite mode. Perhaps the only sort of life that is worth living.
We might ask ourselves why—in those days when Reality Television ruled—we felt so powerfully connected to selves
with even less of a connection than any TV fiction to life—when life is taken, on the philosophical definition just
supplied, to mean a sense of indefinite reality. We might ask ourselves just how tightly we were held in the grip of an
advertising culture dependant for its very existence on the death of the living self.
We might ask ourselves why the day finally arrived when the irreality of reality would leave us cold, and the cooling
entrails of Reality Television were scattered to the remotest borderlands of television scheduling. Perhaps we had
simply had enough of unreal reality. Or perhaps we were simply sick to death of our selves.
For better or worse though, TV was far from being sick to death of us, and in 2009 the ecology of the small screen
would throw up a fresh mutation of programming that, while it would ultimately converge on the same zone of viewer
identity previously targeted by Reality Television (the idiot self), began with the very opposite principle to the reality
principle of Big Brother or Idol.
The very title of Lie to Me (3) is the subtlest of deceptions. To whom is this invitation addressed? Surely it could only be
to us: the viewers. But what could possibly count as a falsehood—as non-reality, as a lie—at this intersection of viewer
interpellation and fictional television … where it is only too easy to lie, in circumstances under which lying is the very
currency of the truth of TV?
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Be honest, Lie to Me is a bog-standard police procedural. But who has ever looked down the barrel of the camera the
way Cal Lightman (Tim Roth) does in the opening credits? Superimposed with the show’s title, his face pours all
manner of agonies and intensities into the command of those three little words.
Soon enough we see, in a manner of speaking, what he is looking at. Lightman is looking at us. And we are being
invited to stare at ourselves.
For there we are in myriad self-permutations, mirrored in a rapid sequence of facial expressions (comprising both
complete faces and parts of faces) infrequently intercut (in approximately a one-to-four ratio) with shots of other
culturally expressive parts of the body, most saliently hands and throats. At one point the face is also, as it were, seen
from behind—in a shot of the back of someone’s head.
Many of these images are accompanied by emotional labels: disgust, contempt, pleasure, fear, surprise. Randomly
interspersed with these are characterisations and physical descriptors: manipulator, pupil constriction, genuine smile.
Some presumably mumbo-jumbo algebra is also tossed into this mix, serving to emphasise, if only ironically, the
(pseudo-)scientific basis of the show’s central conceit.
At the climax of a final flurry of increasingly rapid facial images, the opening credits conclude with a shot of Lightman’s
face drawing back from the aperture of the tube device down which he has been staring. As already suggested, the
overall impact of the visual metonymy is irresistible. We are those faces, etched with the names of emotions unable to
be hidden, while TV itself has been staring at us. Television (the medium of light subjectified through the gaze of a
Lightman) is the “me” of the title, expressing something about who it thinks you and I are.
Lie to Me thus expresses what we might call the truth of lying as it applies to the TV audience: all we can do is lie. From
having truth imposed upon us in the form of Reality Television, we are now entrapped in what purports to be its exact
opposite: our incapacity to tell the truth, our in-built, televisual, lying mechanism. Lie to Me is the bastard offspring of
Reality Television—equally, its perfect, fictional inversion.
Reality Television made it obvious that when TV looks at us it sees no more than what we see looking at it. What else,
in its blindness, could it see? Still we sense that it sees us as if it were looking at us itself, and the trick Lie to Me plays
on the viewer depends on the notion that it has never been possible to do anything else but lie to TV when it gazes
upon us.
That is, we are always lying to TV (and TV seems to know this) because in our responses to it we necessarily exclude
from our selves whatever parts of us will never appear on the screen. How, in our involved watching, could we ever do
otherwise?
TV knows us too well because in knowing itself it knows all it needs to know of us—given our almost total implication
in the medium in the post-Reality Television era—and Lightman’s invitation always already contains the only possible
response: a lie passing for a truth.
Lying is thus embedded in the DNA of any televisual performance whatsoever, but our dangerous dalliance with Reality
Television has caused us to forfeit any other resources by which to perform our selves in relationship to the zone of
reality. Advancing upon us from the flanks of a lost world, the genre effectively boxed us into the role of the self-
preoccupied idiot. It made us private, ignorant—perfect idiots.
Fast forward a few years and Lie to Me has got us pinned down in the crossfire of our sorry attempts, having once been
forced to accept our own peculiar brand of idiocy, to recapture reality. Lie to Me … the invitation comes at us at that
particular and painful moment in television history when—smarting from the aftershocks of Reality Television—we are
least capable of doing anything but continuing to lie, in dutiful, idiotic fashion. At the very least, Lightman’s interrogative
makes bad losers of us all, confronting us as it does with the insurmountable gap separating idiocy from what we
might have formerly known as reality.
To this extent, Lie to Me is the programme we had to have after the era of Reality Television. All the compromised truth
of us has merely been replaced by all of our compromised falsehood. Now, as before, we are sutured to the screen.
Once more the audience (as in the classic forms of Reality Television) has been invited onto the TV screen—an arena
in which every gesture of Lie to Me is only ever (could only ever be) a performance, a lie in that this is merely TV. Yet
there we are, dragged in by the title, which takes us for a certain sort of person, and by Lightman’s gaze, which does
not allow for any deflection of the title’s injunction.
Watching the opening credits of Lie to Me, we find ourselves face to face with characters who, in their explicit
televisuality, can only ever be lying (it’s as if the bluff of Method Acting has finally been called). The taken-for-granted
truth of the viewer as non-idiot (open to the realities beyond the realm of the TV screen) has entirely disappeared, and
so Lie to Me “heals” the scar of selfhood created by Reality Television, compelling us to adopt as our truth an idiotic,
self-conscious performativity, borrowed from the endless repertoire of TV’s affectations.
Such self scrutiny—such an endless re-creation and makeover of the self—may find itself having to draw heavily on the
embellishments for our “private and ignorant” selves that are offered by advertising. So much the better for the coffers
of the television stations. There is profit in the production of idiots.
All of which is ultimately to say that Lie to Me makes it near impossible for us to lie—in the strictest sense—since
Lightman’s invitation rules out that species of lie that would be the truth. Forced to lie, we lie very easily, mimicking the
true lies of TV. Forced to lie, we lose something about ourselves that is human and not of TV.
The question remains then of that lie that, in the very peculiar circumstances of television, would be the truth? How
might we genuinely lie to TV? How might we mount a counter offensive such that we resist TV’s invitations to re-
produce a lie already supplied? (Lie to it as opposed to on it moreover.) Lie to Me, Cal Lightman encourages us, but
Me to Lie? Not likely. At least, not while Lightman is staring me down. And not after all the assaults upon the zone of my
self by Reality Television.
Nowadays, from only being able to be real on TV (in the era of un-real Reality Television), we are only able to lie to it—
and we are as unreal (living out the truth of a lie or the lie of a truth) as we ever were. Absolutely nothing has changed.
From being caught in a reality that was necessarily false (to wit, Reality Television) we are now trapped in a falsehood,
with Lie to Me, that must be real.
What lie might stand for the truth then, in a world in which all reality has become idiotic, in the saturation of all the
circumstances of life by the powers of television? Can we any longer think about our selves without reference to TV?
Classical Greek culture regarded the citizen as the idiot’s opposite. This figure seems a facsimile of selfhood well
beyond our reach, after Reality Television, and after what came after Reality Television. How might the spark of
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citizenship be re-lit, now that the reality of every self has been televised, idiotised, privatised?
Who does television think we are?
Apparently, it thinks of us as creatures very much at ease at this site of the suturing of what’s true and what’s false.
This may be a portal to our thinking our selves otherwise. Which is to say that perhaps television is a little too smug in
its sense of who we are. Possibly, one day, we will learn how to lie, in truth, to the idiot box. The invitation of Lie to Me
will, one day perhaps, be met with a lie that TV will not be expecting: some other truth of us. Do we even know this truth
ourselves, yet?
The late Australian poet John Forbes was conceivably onto something like this with his poem “T.V.” from the collection
Tropical Skiing: “don’t bother telling me about the programs / describe what your set is like the casing [...]” (4). Can we
imagine a world, not necessarily without TV, but where television is more marginal to reality? A world where the
programs are not to be bothered with? A world where, as in that fleeting scene in the first Terminator film (5), humans
might gather for warmth around a fireplace created out of a converted idiot box?
The problem with such utopianism though (if that’s what we should call it), is that Lie to Me very explicitly blurs Forbes’
distinction between itself as program and the “casing” or external reality that frames it. Lie to Me frequently slips a
punchy, non-diegetic montage of images of real figures (Hilary Clinton always seems to stand out) into the interstice of
itself and the advertising break. That is, at the juncture of the show and of the consumerist imperatives that drive its
production as commercial television, an imported grab bag of reality is inserted.
This reinforces how embedded Lie to Me is in the tradition of Reality Television. It’s as if the show, to the degree that it
enacts a seemingly careless appropriation of non-fictional moments of truth, is being driven by elements of the genre it
extends and transcends to perform the role of an insouciant bricoleur of the zone of reality.
How effectively Lie to Me taunts and outmanoeuvres us from the vantage point of fiction. Contrary to the assumption in
Forbes’ poem, the “casing” of reality is not lost but has been actively enlisted in the production of the consumerist idiot.
Instances of real life are now merely way stations for the ever more effective and cynical linkage of fictions like Lie to Me
to those self-addressing and self-serving fictions that encourage us to be all that TV allows us, in our privacy and
ignorance, to be. Reality is now simply kicked to the curb of both fiction and consumerism.
Television knows very well who it thinks we are.
The sad thing is that the zone of TV and the zone of us coincide so very nearly perfectly. In that “very nearly”, however,
lies a glimmer of hope that citizenship may one day emerge from idiocy.
NOTES
(1) “Television pioneer Reg Grundy’s disappointed with reality shows,” AAP, Herald Sun (online), September 20, 2010,
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(2) John Rajchman, “Introduction,” in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, by Gilles Deleuze (New York: Zone Books,
2001), 13-14. 
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Si secca d’estate l’erba
così verde a primavera
diviene quasi una stoppa.
Ce ne stiamo dimenticando
sempre avidi di prati verdeggianti
di fiori variopinti 
spazi smaglianti.
E’ bastata una tenera piantina
i fiori ancora in boccio
le punte appena lilla
lo stelo ritto gramo
grato dello spazio
Nel campo arso è bastato
quel tocco prisco a lanciare
lo sguardo tutt’intorno
e cogliere il ventaglio 
sottile sotteso ad ogni tratto.
